Boone, H. N., Associate Professor, West Virginia University
Boone, D. A., Associate Professor, West Virginia University
Ours, R. L., Graduate Student, West Virginia University
Woloshuk J. M., Extension Professor, West Virginia University Extension Service

ABSTRACT

Agriculture and food production account for thirteen percent of the United States gross domestic product (GDP).  The nature of the agriculture industry creates an ideal target for terrorists to contaminate or adulterate the food supply. This study sought to determine West Virginia beef producers’ perceptions of the potential for agroterrorism and what biosecurity measures they practice.  A mailed questionnaire was sent to a sample population of 355 beef producers, with a response rate of 47.7%. Beef producers in West Virginia agreed that agroterrorism could happen in the United States and in West Virginia; however, the majority did not feel it would happen on their farms.  Isolating new animals was perceived to be the most important biosecurity measure that could be practiced on their farms, but less than half of the producers reported that they isolated new cattle.

Introduction

The United States Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural Research Service (USDA-ARS) estimates one in every eight persons works in some part of the agriculture/food sector (Schneider, Schneider, Webb, Hubbard, & Archer, 2009).  Agriculture and food production account for 13 percent of the United States gross domestic product (GDP), 18 percent of its employment, and 140 billion dollars in revenue (USDA, 2006).  Food production is one of the largest industries in the United States.

Agroterrorism is the deliberate introduction of detrimental agents, biological and otherwise, into the agricultural and food processing system with the intent of causing actual or perceived harm (Schneider, et al., 2009).  The nature of the agriculture industry creates an ideal target for terrorists to contaminate or adulterate the food supply. A terrorist attack on the U.S. food supply could remain hidden for a period of time while the impact is spread to thousands of people. Because of the international trade of agricultural goods (Schneider et al., 2009), the financial losses from a terrorist attack would be devastating not only to producers in the U.S., but other countries as well.

Awareness of food security in the United States was heightened after the September 11^th attack.  On June 12, 2002, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 was signed in to law by Congress (Schneider et al., 2009).  The Act was established to help prevent a bioterrorism attack on the food supply in the United States.  The Food and Drug Administration is responsible for implementing regulations on food production and distribution (Schneider et al., 2009).

Biosecurity procedures can prevent the spreading of diseases from farm to farm. A biosecurity plan might include requiring visitors to change clothing and shoes, disinfecting vehicle tires, and not having close contact with any animals.  For beef producers an effective biosecurity plan can make their cattle less exposed to diseases, which could prevent loss of income.

Government agencies have mandated biosecurity plans for livestock producers. The aim of specific biosecurity programs is to combat specific health hazards on the farm such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), Foot and Mouth Disease, Rabies, and Influenza (Valergakis, Aresenos, & Konomou, 2008). However, the lack of direct or perceived incentives to adopting biosecurity technologies on beef cattle farms has resulted in few beef producers who are implementing recommended biosecurity practices.  A study by DeGraw (2005) found that many beef producers in Florida did not think it was necessary to be prepared for an agroterrorism attack.

Problem Statement

There are 10,653 beef producers in West Virginia.  Unlike the poultry industry where biosecurity plans are required for each operation, beef producers are not required to have biosecurity plans.  Are West Virginia beef producers aware of biosecurity practices and the impact the lack of biosecurity practices can have on their farms due to diseases and potential financial loss? What are West Virginia beef producers’ perceptions of the potential for an agroterrorism attack and what biosecurity measures are they practicing? 

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the study was to determine West Virginia beef cattle producers’ perceptions of their preparedness for an agroterrorism attack. Have they implemented biosecurity plans, and to what degree? What is West Virginia beef producers’ level of knowledge about recommended biosecurity measures and where do they get their information regarding biosecurity practices?     

Research Design

A descriptive research design in the form of a mailed questionnaire was used to determine the perceptions of West Virginia beef cattle producers on their preparedness for an agroterrorism attack.  The target population of this study was beef producers in West Virginia. Due to the lack of availability of an official list of beef producers for the state of West Virginia, the accessible population was selected from a compiled list of participants in the Southern Bull Test, Beef Quality Assurance Program, members on the West Virginia Cattleman’s Association mailing list, participants in the South Branch and Weston livestock markets, and State Livestock Roundup (N = 4600). A random sample of 355 producers was selected from the list (Krejcie & Morgan, 1960).  The questionnaire consisted of Likert-type questions designed to determine the producers’ perceptions about agroterrorism, ratings of the level of perceived threat for various factors, sources where producers would go to gather information on agroterrorism, the importance the producer put on selected safeguards, and to what degree they practiced the safeguard.

The instrument was presented to Livestock Extension Specialists and faculty members in the department of Agricultural and Extension Education at West Virginia University to establish its content and face validity.  The reliability of the instrument was found to be exemplary with the coefficient of .758 (Robinson, Shaver, & Wrightsman, 1991).  Dillman’s Tailored Design Method (2007) was used to collect data for this study. This included an initial mailing, second mailing to non-respondents, and a follow-up post card. 

Perceptions and Preparedness for an Agroterrorism Attack

Beef producers were asked to indicate their perceptions and preparedness of agroterrorism. A majority of the respondents (91.2%) expressed some level of agreement with the statement that agroterrorism could happen in the United States.  Many of these same respondents (73.3%) agreed that agroterrorism could happen in West Virginia.  Only 32 respondents (24.3%) felt that agroterrorism could happen on their farm.

Respondents were also asked to respond to the statement, “I am prepared for an agroterrorism attack.”  Less than one-fourth of the respondents (24.1%) expressed some level of agreement with the statement indicating they were prepared for an attack.

Perceived Threats to Farm  

West Virginia beef producers were asked to rate their level of perceived threat for several aspects of their farm.  The factors included animal death, animal disease outbreak, chemical contamination, employee revenge, feed contamination, fertilizer theft-misuse, loss of income due to market loss, tampering with facilities, tampering with fences-gates, water contamination, and Zoonotic illness.  Over fifty percent of the respondents indicated that five of the threats posed little to no threat to their farming operations.  The five threats included employee revenge (86.7%), fertilizer theft/misuse (71.1%), Zoonotic illnesses (67.1%), chemical contamination (66.7%), and tampering with facilities (54.8%).

Over half of the respondents rated the remaining five threats as posing some level of threat to their beef cattle operation.  The threats included feed contamination (51.8%), tampering with fences-gates (60.4%), water contamination (60.6%), animal disease outbreak (62.0%), animal death (64.9%), and loss of income due to market loss (66.9%).

Attended Workshop on Biosecurity-Agroterrorism

West Virginia beef producers were asked if they had ever attended a workshop on biosecurity-agroterrorism. Twenty-eight (20.6%) beef producers said they have attended a biosecurity-agroterrorism workshop at least once, 11 (8.1%) more than once, and 97 (71.3%) reported they had never attended a workshop.

Where Producers would Seek Advice in Event of an Act of Agroterrorism

Respondents were asked from whom they would seek advice if they suspected an act of agroterrorism had occurred on their farm. Seventy-one (51.1%) respondents indicated they would contact a veterinarian, while, 59 (42.8%) beef producers indicated they would call an Extension agent.  Other sources of information included: the West Virginia Department of Agriculture (WVDA) (52.9%), another livestock producer (15.9%), law enforcement (63.0%), the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) (12.3%), producer associations (3.6%), state emergency management agencies (4.3%), county emergency management (8.0%), and Homeland Security (6.5%).  Eight respondents (5.8%) indicated they would not know who to contact for advice.

Importance and Degree Safeguards Were Practiced on Farm

Respondents were given a number of safeguards to prevent agroterrorism and asked to rate their importance and the degree they were practiced on the farm.  The 16 safeguards included conducting background checks on potential hires, providing regular meetings with employees, isolating a new animal, limiting visitors to the farm, requiring a waiting period for visitors, requiring employees to use footbaths, requiring employees to wear gloves, requiring employees to wear overalls, requiring employees to wear shoe covers, requiring people entering the farm to shower, requiring people leaving the farm to shower, requiring visitors to disinfect vehicles, requiring visitors to stop at a biosecurity checkpoint, requiring visitors to use footbaths, requiring visitors to wear gloves, and providing a training program(s) for employees to a recognize and report diseases.

Two of the practices, isolating new animals (85.8%), and providing a training program(s) for employees to recognize and report diseases (50.4%), were rated as moderate or major importance by over fifty percent of the respondents.  Nine of the practices were rated as moderate or major importance by over twenty-five percent of the respondents.  These practices included:  limiting visitors to the farm (42.5%), conducting background checks on potential hires (38.2%), providing regular meetings with employees(37.6%) , requiring a waiting period for visitors(34.4%) , requiring employees to wear gloves (28.9%), requiring visitors to use footbaths (28.7%), requiring employees to wear shoe covers (28.3%), requiring visitors to stop at a biosecurity checkpoint (25.8%), and requiring employees to wear overalls (25.0%).

Table 1

Farm Safeguards Rated Moderate or Major Importance by Respondents

	N	%
Isolating new animals	108	85.8
Training program(s) for employees to a disease	56	50.4
Limiting visitors	54	42.5
Conducting background checks on potential hires	42	38.2
Have regular meetings with employees	41	37.6
Requiring a waiting period for visitors	43	34.4
Requiring employees to wear gloves	33	28.9
Requiring visitors to use footbaths	35	28.7
Requiring employees to wear shoe covers	34	28.3
Requiring visitors to stop at a biosecurity checkpoint	31	25.8
Requiring employees to wear overalls	30	25.0
Requiring employees to use footbaths	27	22.8
Requiring visitors to wear gloves	24	20.2
Requiring visitors to disinfect vehicles	20	17.2
Requiring people leaving the farm to shower	10	8.4
Requiring people entering the farm to shower	9	7.6

 

Eleven of the safeguards were rarely or never practiced by over fifty percent of the respondents.  These safeguards included: requiring visitors to use footbaths (67.2%), requiring a waiting period for visitors (66.2%), requiring visitors to stop at a biosecurity checkpoint (61.1%), requiring visitors to wear gloves (61.1%), requiring people entering the farm to shower (60.3%), requiring people leaving the farm to shower (59.2%), limiting visitors to the farm (58.6%), requiring visitors to disinfect vehicles (58.3%), requiring employees to use footbaths (55.5%), requiring employees to wear overalls (51.2%), and requiring employees to wear shoe covers (50.8%).  Only one safeguard, isolating new animals (76.9%) was practiced moderately or always by beef producers.

Table 2

Safeguards Rarely or Never Practiced on Farm 

	N	%
Requiring visitors to use footbaths	86	67.2
Requiring a waiting period for visitors	86	66.2
Requiring visitors to stop at a biosecurity checkpoint	77	61.1
Requiring visitors to wear gloves	77	61.1
Requiring people entering the farm to shower	76	60.3
Requiring people leaving the farm to shower	74	59.2
Limiting visitors	75	58.6
Requiring visitors to disinfect vehicles	74	58.3
Requiring employees to use footbaths	71	55.5
Requiring employees to wear overalls	66	51.2
Requiring employees to wear shoe covers	66	50.8
Requiring employees to wear gloves	61	47.6
Conducting background checks on potential hires	49	39.2
Have regular meetings with employees	44	34.9
Training program(s) for employees to a disease	41	32.3
Isolating new animals	23	17.7

 

Conclusions

A majority of the West Virginia beef producers agreed that agroterrorism could occur in the United States and in West Virginia, less than twenty-five percent of the respondents felt an incident could occur on their farm.  Less than twenty-five percent of the respondents agreed that they were prepared for an agroterrorism attack on their farm.

Over half of the respondents rated the five situations as posing some level of threat to their beef cattle operation.  The threats included feed contamination, tampering with fences-gates, water contamination, animal disease outbreak, animal death, and loss of income due to market loss.

Nearly three-fourths of the producers had never attended a workshop on biosecurity-agroterrorism.  If presented with an agroterrorism attack, producers would contact their local veterinarian and/or Extension agent. 

Many of the common agroterrorism practices were rated as important by the producers but only one practice, isolating new animals, was practiced on a regular basis.  This is similar to the results in Florida where DeGraw (2005) found that Florida beef producers indicated that limiting visitors was their most important safeguard and the one safeguard most frequently practiced, while isolating a new animal was second most popular safeguard.

Recommendations

The researchers make the following recommendations based on the results of this study:

• More information about biosecurity and agroterrorism should be available to beef producers in West Virginia.
• Studies should be conducted on other livestock species in West Virginia to determine biosecurity practices and educational needs.
• Articles on biosecurity measures should be prepared for farm magazines since they were the preferred means of securing published information on biosecurity.

References

Degraw, J. (2005). Perceptions of Florida Beef Producers on Preparedness for an Agroterrorism Attack.  (Unpublished master’s thesis). University of Florida, Gainesville, FL.

Dillman, D.A. (2007). Mail and Internet surveys: The tailored design method (2nd ed.). New Jersey: John Wiley.

Krejcie, R.V. & Morgan, D.W. (1960). Determining sample size for research activities. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 30, 607-610.    

Robinson, J., Shaver P., Wrightsman, L. (1991).  Measures of personality and social psychological attitudes. (pp 1-16) New York: Academic Press.

Schneider, R. Goodrich, Schneider, K.R., Webb, C.D., Hubbard, M., & Archer, D.L. (2009). Agroterrorism in the U.S.: An overview(FSHN0521). Retrieved from University of Florida IFAS Extension web-site:  http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/fs126

United States Department of Agriculture. (2006) Pre-Harvest Security Guidelines and Checklist 2006. Washington DC.

Valergakis, G., Arsenos, G., & Konomou, G. (2008). Biosecurity measures on cattle farms. Journal of the Hellenic Veterinary Medical Society, 5a (1), 9-22.

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